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UK policy promotes third sector organisations as providers of NHS funded health and
social care. We examine the evidence for this policy through a systematic literature review.
Our results highlight several problems of studies comparing non-proﬁts with other provider
forms, questioning their usefulness for drawing lessons outside the place of study. Most
studies deem contextual factors and the regulatory framework in which providers operate
as much more important than ownership form. We conclude that the literature does not
support the policy of a larger role for the third sector in healthcare, let alone a switch to
a market-based system.
The current public sector reform agenda introducing markets and competing providers
into the NHS, including private non-profit providers, has to contend with a tradition of
public provision and growing public anxiety about the privatisation of clinical services.
Privatisation attempts have already been repudiated in Scotland and Wales. There is the
fear that efficiency is being traded off against quality when profit-making firms compete for
contracts. The non-distribution constraint of non-profit organisations, or the ‘third sector’
as it is usually known in Britain, is assumed to prevent such quality-shaving (Hansmann,
1980). But what is the evidence in support of the non-profit sector as a provider of health
care and to what degree is such evidence relevant in the context of a universal and
comprehensive system of healthcare such as the NHS?
This article, using the method of a systematic literature review, investigates the
international research evidence on the relative performance of the non-profit sector with
both the for-profit and public sector. We first present the theoretical justification for using
the non-profit sector in the delivery of health care. We then present the recent UK policy
reform agenda of bringing in non-public providers into the NHS. We briefly describe the
methodology of our systematic literature review before presenting the findings from this
review and discussing a number of concerns about the literature. We conclude that the
evidence does not support the claims about the superior performance of the non-profit
sector or therefore a switch to a provider-based system, based upon market principles,
even where the providers are non-profit organisations.
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Theor ies o f ownersh ip e f fec ts on e ffic iency and the par t i cu la r i t i es
o f the hea l th and soc ia l ca re serv ices
The introduction of non-profits in NHS market reforms are informed by economic theory
about the benefits of competitive markets. Economists advocate competitive markets as
a means of containing costs by substituting competing providers for public monopolies.
This policy has been a priority of health system reform in Britain and elsewhere in Europe
(Mossialos and Le Grand, 1999). Under New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ welfare reform project,
the Third Sector has played a pivotal role (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). It is argued that,
while markets can provide an incentive to cut costs at the expense of quality, non-profits,
defined as firms that are not motivated by profit maximisation, are more focused on
patients than on their own self interest, and therefore are less likely to sacrifice quality
in the pursuit of efficiency (Chalkley and Malcolmson, 1998). Thus, from an economic
theory perspective, this is a claim about the relative likelihood of principal-agent problems
giving rise to market failure.
Agency problems are the subject of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985).
Economic theory predicts that the benefits of private ownership and competition
(Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973) will lead to greater consumer choice, more
innovative services, more efficient management, a leaner public workforce and thus lower
costs (Mossialos and Le Grand, 1999). However, in the case of health care, transaction
cost economics also predicts accompanying agency problems because managers of for-
profit organisations have an incentive to exploit two fundamental weaknesses of the
market: information asymmetry and incomplete contracts. Asymmetric information in
health, childcare and nursing services leaves the potential ‘customers’ vulnerable to
supplier exploitation because of their lack of knowledge and the non-availability of
relevant information on quality. Thus, patients or GPs who recommend/commission
treatments on their behalf cannot contract for quality because they are unlikely to
be aware of all its aspects (Arrow, 1963; Chalkley and Malcolmson, 1998), which is
why, in practice, most treatments are recommended and/or commissioned by the GP on
behalf of patients. Furthermore, the complexity and uncertainty of service requirements
mean that it is difficult to specify the precise requirements, and thus contracts between
the purchaser and provider are deemed to be ‘incomplete’, in the sense that not all
possible eventualities can be written into a contract. In other words, there is a risk that
profits will be maximised by reducing service quality, known as ‘quality shaving’, or
by displacing costs on to staff, users and their families, known as ‘externalising’ the
costs.
According to Hansmann (1980), the theory underpinning non-profit organisations
is that in public services, where quality is at a premium, the non-distribution constraint
prevents efficiency being traded off against quality when firms compete for contracts. In
effect, firms without owners who benefit financially from surplus generation are deemed
more trustworthy and less likely to exploit purchasers and patients.
The literature is dominated by an economic focus on principal-agent problems and
the comparative cost of controlling them using different governance models, such as
markets or hierarchies (Williamson, 1985). Much less attention has been given in the
regulatory literature to analyses of non-profit, non-governmental bodies taking over the
health care functions of governments, which is the British and European focus of interest
(Saltman et al., 2002).
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Background
Until recently, the non-profit sector played a marginal role in the provision of health
services in the UK NHS (see, for example, Mohan, 1984, 1985). In 2000, the ‘NHS Plan’
pledged a major policy shift to non-state provision of healthcare, with the New Labour
government declaring its intention to develop partnerships with the independent sector
(both private for-profit and the voluntary sector) (NHS, 2000: 5).
Building on the purchaser provider split of 1991, the government introduced the
2003 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act, which allows
commercial contracting for mainstream hospital service and established a new type of
non-profit company called foundation trusts. Foundation trust hospitals are independent of
government and have greater autonomy than their predecessor, the NHS trust established
in 1991. By 1 May 2008, there were 96 NHS foundation trusts in total (Monitor, 2008).
The introduction of foundation trusts was accompanied by a programme of commercial
contracting for elective care under the Independent Sector Treatment Centre programme.
In 2004, primary care was also opened to competing commercial providers, including a
new non-profit body corporate, the ‘community interest company’, which the government
advocated for GP practices.
The government introduced a range of other measures to lower the barriers to entry
for voluntary agencies (also called ‘Third Sector’) and to abolish the public sector’s
monopoly (see Department of Health, 2006; HM Treasury, 2002, 2006; NHS Primary
Care Contracting, 2006).
A Third Sector Commissioning Task Force was established in 2005 (Third Sector
Commissioning Task Force, 2006) and the government made available start-up funds to
enable the non-profit sector to compete on a ‘level playing field’ (Department of Health,
2006: 175–6). In August 2007, the Minister for Care Services for England announced the
launch of the Department of Health’s £73m Social Enterprise Investment Fund to support
and encourage the development of a social enterprise sector in the delivery of health and
social care services. In February 2008, the fund was increased by £27m to £100 over four
years from 2007/08.1
Her Majesty’s Treasury (2004: 3) states that non-profits have ‘the capacity to build
users’ trust’, while the Department of Health (DoH) has presented the policy of favouring
social enterprises over for-profit providers as a means of enhancing community-based
care. The DoH describes non-profits as having better relations with particular patient
groups, and expertise in specific areas, and praises them as innovative providers of primary
care and as value-driven (Department of Health, 2006). However, the government cites
no evidence in support of these advantages. In this paper, we examine the theory and
evidence behind the claim that non-profit corporate behaviour is more benevolent than
for-profit corporate behaviour by drawing on a range of systematic literature reviews and
conducting our own systematic literature review.
Methods
In 2006, we undertook a systematic literature review on the performance of the non-
profit sector in health and social care, searching 26 sources with nine specified search
terms, which were various synonyms and spellings of ‘not-for-profit’. This reflects
the absence of a universally agreed terminology of not-for-profits, which include
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Table 1 Research protocol and search strategy
Task Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Define research
question and
key themes
Review of
theoretical
literature on
non-profit
performance
Arrival at five
key themes
for later
analysis
Identify search
terms
Synonyms of
‘nonprofit’ in
different
spellings (10
terms)
Trial search
using five
databases
Refinement of
search terms:
9 search
terms∗
(combined
with either
health care or
social care)
Search Initial search of
26 sources with
specified search
terms, confined
to publications
2001–2006 in
English
language
First sifting by
scanning of
titles,
subtitles
Second sifting by
scanning of
abstracts/ first
paragraphs)
Checking for
cross-references
to identify
further relevant
studies which
were not
captured by
electronic
search; third
sifting for
duplicate articles
which were
yielded by
different sources
Note:∗ The following nine terms were used: ‘not for profit’, ‘non profit’ (first two terms allowing
for different spellings), ‘social enterprise’, ‘co-operative’, ‘foundation trusts’, ‘community owned’,
‘independent sector’, ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘third sector’.
unincorporated community and voluntary groups, co-operatives, registered charities and
friendly societies. Not-for-profit is used synonymously with the voluntary sector, the third
sector, the community sector and sometimes the independent sector. The UK Department
of Health most recently introduced the term ‘social enterprise’ to describe organisations
that do not distribute any profits to the owners or stakeholders.
The initial search covering the period 2001–06 yielded over 14,000 hits, including
duplicates. This period was chosen in order to review the most up-to-date evidence
that had not been covered in previous systematic reviews. In the final analysis, we
included 163 studies that met the criterion of having compared the performance of
different ownership types of health and social care providers (see Table 1 for our research
protocol and search strategy). The review builds on three authoritative previous systematic
literature reviews on non-profit sector performance conducted by the New York Academy
of Medicine (1999), Devereux et al. (2002) and Currie et al. (2003) by posing similar
research questions in relation to more recent studies.
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Table 2 Country of origin of papers and health care system
Country of origin Number Universality Payment system
USA 124
– Several states or national level 82 Non-universal Multi-payer
– Single state 42
UK 13 Universal Single payer
Canada 9 Universal Single payer
Israel 5 Universal Single payer
New Zealand 4 Universal Multi-payer
Switzerland 2 Non-universal Multi-payer
France 1 Universal Multi-payer
Germany 1 Universal Multi-payer
International studies 4 – –
Total 163
Note: ∗ A full review of all 163 studies is available from the authors on request.
The selected studies were then thematically analysed according to five performance
measures chosen on the basis of the theoretical assumptions about non-profit performance
and the discussions in previous literature reviews on this topic.
Key find ings
C o u n t r y b a c k g r o u n d
The vast majority, 124 of the 163 studies, wereUS studies, four studies were cross-national,
and the remaining 35 studies from a variety of industrialised countries as Table 2 shows.
Canada, New Zealand, the UK and Israel have universal systems, while the US and
Switzerland have non-universal health systems. Yet, even universal systems vary in the
range of services covered, and the extent of coverage. For example, most long-term care
for older people in the UK is not included in the NHS. Another difference between the
countries is the payment systems, which can be multi-payer or single payer. In multi-payer
systems, health care is funded by a variety of public and private contributions and there is
no one central organisation that administers the collection of fees and payment of health
care costs. These three dimensions, universality, coverage and payment system, need to
be taken into account when comparing health systems.
For the UK policy context, the comparison between non-profits and the public sector
is the most important one. However, due to the US-dominance of the literature, the
comparison was mainly between non-profit and for-profit institutions. Only 22 of the 163
studies included the public sector in their comparisons.
Themes in the l i t e r a tu r e
We then examined the studies in terms of claimed advantages of the non-profit sector:
quality, efficiency, innovation, trust and the emphasis on values in the non-profit sector.
Table 3 shows the findings of the studies in terms of these five factors, in so far as
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Table 3 Performance measures, frequency of studies and findings
Performance measure No. of studies Tendency of findings
Efficiency 15 Ambiguous
Quality of care 43 In favour of non-profits (comparison with
for-profits)
Innovation 4 No clear differences between sectors
(non-profit versus public)
Trust 3 Non-profits considered more trustworthy than
for-profits
Value-driven 27 Non-profits more community-oriented than
for-profits, but outperformed by public sector
the studies explicitly compare performance along these dimensions. While some have
examined several dimensions, others have examined none. We consider each of these
dimensions in turn.
Efficiency and quality of care . The performance literature was mainly preoccupied with
the two themes of efficiency and costs on the one hand and quality of care on the other
hand. Forty studies dealt with financial performance indicators in the broad sense, usually
focusing on the analysis of health care affordability and cost containment strategies. These
included measuring the impact of changes in reimbursement methods on providers and
the impact of conversions or mergers on costs, profits and efficiency.
Only 15 studies dealt with efficiency in the strict sense (meaning the ratio of the
output to the input). Efficiency studies usually employed some form of regression analysis
or specific data analysis techniques, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The overall
findings relating to efficiency were inclusive: while six studies did not find any difference
between ownership forms, four studies found non-profits more efficient and five studies
found for-profit organisations more efficient.
As one would expect, for-profit hospitals were more likely to offer the more profitable
medical services and were more responsive to changes in service profitability, while
government hospitals were more likely to offer the less profitable services. Non-profits
often fell in the middle (Hansmann et al., 2002; Horwitz, 2005). Becker and Potter (2002)
concluded that there appears to be an inverse relationship between hospital efficiency
and social responsibility.
Quality of care was the outcome variable in 43 studies. Studies often reviewed
differences in quality of care on the basis of staff/patient ratios, user satisfaction, mortality
and hospitalisation rates or the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS)
index, a widely used standardised health care performance instrument in the US, the
skill level of staff and various other indicators. There was considerable support for the
contention that the growth of the for-profit sector led to declining service quality (32 of
43 studies), with only one study finding that the for-profit sector performed better in this
respect and another 14 studies detecting no differences in the quality of care between
the non-profit and the for-profit sectors. Only studies using staff ratios as the indicator for
quality of care consistently revealed that both the skill level and the staff/patient ratio were
better in non-profit than for-profit institutions. Crucially for the UK health care context, the
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two studies that included government-run facilities found that these had the best staffing
ratios (Harrington et al., 2001; Berta et al., 2005).
I nnova t ion , t rus t and va lues
Studies looking at innovation by the non-profit sector were rare, probably due to
the difficulty in measuring this concept. The four studies we identified relied mainly
on self-reports by staff, thus introducing a likelihood of bias, or else used indicators
such as diversification, growth in clientele and user involvement. The literature found
a general tendency towards organisational isomorphism. Attempts to include non-
profits as innovative providers of care may be undermined by institutionalisation,
professionalisation and bureaucratisation. By competing for contracts, the non-profit
sector has been forced to adopt government norms and subjected to standardisation
and thus had lost its niche character and innovativeness, some of the alleged advantages
of non-profits (Rathgeb Smith and Lipsky, 1993).
There were even fewer studies looking at the trustworthiness of the non-profit sector.
These used a national opinion poll or a survey among physicians. The three studies we
found considered non-profits more trustworthy than for-profits, in line with the theoretical
prediction. However, the US work also highlights the public’s ignorance of what a non-
profit actually is and how it is distinctive from other ownership forms, making it difficult
to place much reliance on the results.
Studies looking at the value-driven character of non-profits were more frequent.
We included all studies under this category that looked at the provision of community
benefits including uncompensated care and community services. Nine of 124 US studies
dealt with the issue of uncompensated or charitable care, that is the extent to which
health care organisations provided care for which they received no reimbursement. This
reflects the preoccupation with the 47 million people who are uninsured and ineligible
for treatment (see US Census Bureau, 2007) and the requirement to treat some patients
without charge to qualify for non-profit status and thus tax exempt bond finance. The main
thrust in the literature was that non-profits aremore community oriented and providemore
uncompensated care, whereas for-profit firms seek profits and avoid unprofitable services
(Castle, 2005; Dellana and Glascoff, 2001; Sikorska-Simmons, 2005). When the public
sector is included, however, non-profits often only fall in the middle, being outperformed
by the public sector. Although, as presented above, there was no unanimous support for
concerns that non-profits were less efficient than for-profit organisations, there seems to
be an inverse relationship between hospital efficiency and social responsibility (see also
Becker and Potter, 2002). As one would expect, for-profit hospitals were more likely to
offer the more profitable medical services and were more responsive to changes in service
profitability, while government hospitals were more likely to offer less profitable services
(Horwitz, 2005).
The impo r t ance o f the r e gu l a to r y f r amework
The majority of studies concluded that ownership form was not important in determining
performance in a market. The regulatory framework under which hospitals and health
insurance providers operate proved much more important in explaining the performance
of different medical care providers (e.g. Berta et al., 2005). In a hostile market
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environment, there was little to distinguish non-profits from for-profit organisations.
The findings seemed consistent with a growing suspicion about the increasing
commercialisation in the health care sector and the view that many not-for-profit
institutions were for-profits ‘in disguise’. It is therefore crucial to consider the market
conditions under which non-profit organisations operated and the requirements of the
regulatory framework.
Discuss ion
We have many concerns with this literature as most studies are characterised by
methodological problems, including the definition and measurement of the key variables,
quality and efficiency, and the omission of control variables and context and regulatory
framework. Still less do they consider universal health care systems. We consider each of
these in more detail.
A particularly serious shortcoming of the quantitative literature was the failure to
define key terms and establish valid measures of key variables. While many of the studies
purported to measure efficiency, that is the relationship of inputs to outputs, most studies
were in fact measuring economy as reflected in operating costs. Furthermore, the data
sets were usually aggregated hospital statistics, created and generated for other purposes,
resulting in some of the measures having little sensitivity or specificity. Some of the quality
of care measures relied on only imperfect measures or did not include any objective
assessment of quality. Cost comparisons were difficult to undertake on the basis of the
available data.
According to Currie et al. (2003), the difficulty of assessing efficiency due to the
lack of appropriate outcome measures and the fact that information on cost differences
cannot bemeaningfully interpreted in the absence of information on service quality means
that results may not be interpretable and explains the many conflicting findings in the
literature.
The studies largely focused on the US. A major limitation was their focus on
providers within a market for healthcare. Furthermore, their main concern was to identify
behavioural changes on the part of healthcare providers when reimbursement systems,
ownership form or the regulatory framework changed.
Much of the research comparing provider performance omitted the basic descriptive
data including population coverage, services provided, and access criteria, including
the regulatory framework. Because of the absence of a universal base in the US, the
measurement of performance is difficult as it is confounded by issues of adjustment for
case-mix, selection bias, etc. Studies comparing non-profits across countries or even in
the US across states did not take sufficient account of differences in population access
and coverage in market oriented versus universal, integrated non-market systems. For
example, while a fewUS studies concluded that the public sector seems to be the provider
of ‘last resort’ in a mixed economy of health care providing for those who cannot afford
other forms of health care (e.g. Horwitz, 2003; Green et al., 2005), this was often not
incorporated into the study design.
A necessary corollary of the fact that most of the studies were from the US, which
does not provide universal care, is that they rarely dealt with universal and comprehensive
systems as in most Western European countries. Surprisingly, there were no US studies
comparing non-profits, for-profits with the two publicly funded and owned systems of
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integrated health care provision in the US, namely the Department of Veterans Affairs
and the native American indigent health service. This therefore raises concerns about
the relevance of such US-based studies to a system such as the NHS with universal and
comprehensive coverage.
What conc lus ions can we draw f rom th is fo r UK po l i cy?
The key criticism of the literature is that the studies are not designed to address the core
values of national health systems, namely universal access, coverage and distribution of
resources and services on the basis of need. The wider system analysis is absent.
Quite clearly the US focus of the literature helps to explain this omission. But its
economic focus is another limitation. Hansmann’s (1980) and other’s characterisation of
non-profits as constitutionally less prone to agency problems is usually interpreted as a
market failure analysis, that is as an analysis of the economic efficiency of contracting
in which market relations are assumed. Public administration questions about the effects
of contacting out on the infrastructure and objectives of health care planning are rarely
posed. From this perspective, Hansmann-like claims about trust and organisational values
have limited relevance.
The evidence from this plus other systematic literature reviews (New York Academy
of Medicine, 1999; Devereux et al., 2002; Currie et al., 2003) shows that there is no
consistent evidence that non-profits perform better than the private sector in either non-
universal or universal health systems, and the review of the literature shows that in
a competitive environment non-profit providers behave much like for-profit providers,
which raises considerable doubts regarding the role of trust and benevolence in non-
profit organisations. As such, therefore, the evidence does not support a policy of using
non-profits in a switch from an integrated, publicly owned and provided system to a
provider-based system with market incentives and principles.
Although the UK policy guidance emphasises the ‘value-driven’ character of not-for-
profits and the mission statement of such organisations is, according to theory (Hansmann,
1980), crucial for their trustworthiness, the role of the non-profits’ mission is increasingly
questioned in the US. Bennett et al. (2003: 342) point out that ‘the vagueness of NPs’
missions gives managers an almost unmatched degree of autonomy’. While they cannot
redistribute profits to any stakeholders or owners, they can make a surplus. Indeed, a
surplus is required for making new investments to stay in the market or paying back loans
and necessarily entails the risk of service cuts if financial demands cannot otherwise be
met.
Non-profits are also making increased use of performance-related pay, which is seen
as an incentive to align the interests of non-profit managers with those of their stakeholders
(Bennett et al., 2003). A recent volume of Health Affairs devoted entirely to this debate
concluded that when it came to ‘mission versus market’, the market ruled. In the US,
contracting and the incorporation of non-profit organisations as mainstream providers
made non-profits more business-like, focusing on their financial position at the expense
of flexibility and responsiveness. Finally, this need for financial viability in a system aiming
first and foremost at cost containment tended to reduce their value-driven character.
Historical literature from the UK shows that the pre-NHS hospital system, largely
based on non-profit organisations, failed to achieve any correspondence between
provision and health needs (Mohan, 2002). The NHS was established to deal with a
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number of serious weaknesses of the non-profit health care system. The criticisms need
to be considered in a back-to-the-future scenario of increasing dependence on non-profit
involvement in health care.
Data issues are a further problem. Currently the data returns from private providers
in the UK are extremely poor, making it difficult to monitor quality and performance let
alone access and equity. This is compounded by the fact that as yet the government does
not require the independent sector to provide data on beds, staff, administrative costs and
their cost structure.
To conclude, the evidence does not support the policy of a larger role for the third
sector in healthcare, including the establishment of foundation trusts, let alone a switch
to a market-based system. This is a crucial finding, given the emphasis that the UK
government places on evidence-based research that, as we have shown, challenges the
a priori beliefs about the advantages of non-profits and market oriented health care. Some
years ago Watson and Hay (2003) challenged New Labour’s presentation of globalisation
as an unbudgetable constraint on social policy. Policy was not inevitably determined
by the constraints of globalisation, they argued; instead, the government’s interpretation
of globalisation was conditioned by a predetermined choice of policy direction. In the
context of the present article, it could be argued that we are not seeing an evidence-
based policy; instead, interpretation of evidence about non-profit provision is similarly
conditioned by a prior decision to move provision out of the public sector.
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